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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the process of banking integration in the EU15 countries and the 
Eurozone by testing for convergence in bank efficiency among commercial banks. We use a 
two-step approach: First we estimate efficiency by applying an innovative methodological 
approach that treats banks’ non-performing loans as an undesirable output. Second, we apply 
the Phillips and Sul (2007) panel convergence methodology to assess the convergence process 
in European banking. Our results indicate an overall decline in efficiency and no evidence of 
group convergence following the financial crisis. However, we find the presence of club 
formation with typically weak convergence. The heterogeneity displayed by the transition 
parameters for the individual countries and the notable decrease in competition levels post 2008 
highlight the impact of the financial crisis on the integration process. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the introduction of the Single Market by the European Commission in 1992, several 
initiatives and regulatory reforms have been implemented to create a fully functioning single 
market. The integration of the European banking sector is integral to this ambition. Evidence 
from recent studies based on data prior to the financial crisis show that while the European 
banking sector has been integrating, some fragmentation are still inherent due to national 
characteristics (Baele, 2006; Affinito and Farabullini, 2006; Vajanne, 2007, and Rughoo and 
Sarantis, 2012). 
As widely reported, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has uncovered several systemic 
weaknesses amongst European banks which have resulted in higher credit, refinancing and 
sovereign risks. A current analysis of European banking integration would provide a deeper 
insight into the impact of the GFC on the functioning of the single banking market. We argue 
that the unprecedented scale of governmental bailouts could distort the competitiveness within 
the Euro area and Eurozone. The competitiveness could be distorted above all by the fact that 
some key market players have received unfair advantages through cheaper capital and funding. 
For example, the UK’s estimated package could reach US $1.1 trillion in order to restore 
confidence in the banking system. In Denmark, 13 of the country’s 140 banks were bailed out 
by the central bank or acquired by their competitors. The expected volume of the rescue 
package is estimated to be EUR 593.9 billion (European Commission, 2012, Bloomberg, 
2009). 
 This paper contributes to the ongoing empirical research on banking integration in several 
ways. Firstly, assuming that the integration process has been significantly undermined and to 
some extent undergone a reversal due to the GFC, we investigate whether the single market 
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initiative for a homogenous and competitive banking market has extended to the cost structures 
and efficiency of banks. In particular, we examine the impact of the GFC and the ensuing 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis on bank efficiency. Secondly, we analyse and estimate the 
convergence of the European banking system using the Phillips and Sul convergence technique 
which provides an empirical assessment of long-run equilibrium within a heterogeneous set-
up without necessitating any assumptions about stationarity. Thirdly and finally, we estimate 
the competition level in European banking pre-and post- crisis by deploying the Rosse-Panzar 
method.  
 To estimate bank efficiency, we apply a parametric distance function approach using both 
desirable and undesirable outputs in the production process (i.e. NPLs). This novel approach 
of measuring bank efficiency is motivated by the fact that ignoring NPLs can bias the efficiency 
results (Assaf et al. 2013; Fujii et al. 2014). The inclusion of NPLs in our estimation is even 
reinforced by the fact that the average bank asset quality for most EU member states has 
plummeted significantly following the economic recession. To test bank convergence, we 
propose the Phillips and Sul (2007) methodology which provides important advantages over 
the widely used β-convergence and σ-convergence methods.7. The β-convergence, for instance, 
is uninformative on the behaviour of the dispersion of the entire cross-section, while the σ- 
convergence does not allow for cases where individual countries may be transitionally 
divergent (Quah, 1996; Islam, 2003). The Phillips and Sul convergence technique, on the other 
hand, identifies whether group convergence is present and whether sub-clusters of countries 
are converging. It also enables the estimation of the relative transition parameters for each 
country in relation to the panel average. This gives us additional information on the speed of 
the convergence process over time.  
                                                 
7 See Adam et al.2002; Vajanne,2007 and Weill,2009.  
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Finally, to provide a full picture of bank performance and convergence, we also examine the 
degree of competition within the banking systems. We apply a standard non-structural 
approach based on the Rosse-Panzar methodological framework. The rest of this paper is 
organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on efficiency and integration in the EU 
banking sector. Section 3 and 4 describe the methods and data used. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, and finally Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review on bank efficiency and convergence in the EU 
Brouwer (2005) defines financial market integration as a process whereby financial markets 
become increasingly integrated through the linkages created by prices and returns on financial 
assets. As discussed by Stavarek et al (2012), one crucial conduit for financial integration is 
the integration of financial infrastructure which consists of a set of inter-connected systems 
such as payment systems 8  and credit registers that facilitate financial market operations. 
Consequently, the integration of financial infrastructure should lead to cost savings and create 
a more efficient financial market. Empirical research focusing on the efficiency of European 
banks has attracted considerable attention over the last decade. Studies have linked the 
efficiency of the banking industry to several interesting hypotheses such as integration and 
convergence, competitiveness and systemic stability within the European Union. In general, 
there is support that greater competition, faster technologies, financial innovations, economic 
and financial freedom have driven banks to minimize costs and improve their efficiencies 
(Fiordelisi and Molyneux,2010; Chortareas et al, 2013). Given the link between competition 
and the growing focus on improving efficiency, it can be said that within an integrated or 
                                                 
8 In the Euro area, the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) which aims to provide an integrated payment system 
was rolled out between 2006-2008 and in 2011, the SEPA started processing card payments.  
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integrating retail banking sector, these forces should translate into convergence in bank 
efficiency.  
The link between efficiency and integration in the European banking sector has been 
widely investigated (Molyneux et al. 1997; Goddard et al. 2007; Brissimis et al. 2010, 
Fiordelisi et al.. 2011, among others). Berger (2003) examines the potential efficiency effects 
of a single market for financial services in Europe, but does not find support for a positive 
effect on efficiency. He attributes this finding to the consolidation of the banking sector which 
disrupted the supply of relationship credit and led to the loss of relationship information. Casu 
and Molyneux (2003) do not find support either for the integration of the banking sector across 
several European countries.  
Some mixed findings are however reported in other related studies (Altunbas et al. 
2001; Lozano-Vivas et al. 2001; Casu and Girardone, 2010; Carbo et al. 2007; Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Weill, 2009). Using the β- and σ convergence tests9 on cost 
efficiency scores for the period 1994 to 2005, the study by Weill (2009), for example finds 
evidence of convergence10 and concludes that a monopolistic market structure exists in the EU 
banking markets and that banking competition did not actually increase during the period 
investigated. Supporting this, Casu and Girardone (2010), who also apply the β- and σ 
convergence tests on estimated cost efficiency for the EU 15 countries during 1997 to 2003, 
find evidence for efficiency convergence. However, they do not support that the hypothesis 
that the introduction of the single currency had an effect on convergence and improvement in 
efficiency levels.  
                                                 
9 The β-convergence is drawn from the growth literature and models the “catch-up effects” by regressing the 
growth rate of a variable on the initial level while σ-convergence looks at the dispersion of the cross-section. 
Convergence is evident is the dispersion decreases over time. 
10 These findings are also subject to robustness checks including two other frontier techniques namely, a time-
varying WITHIN model and a distribution free approach (DFA) model as well as the use of the production 
approach instead of the intermediation approach in the event that the specifications of inputs and outputs have 
biased the results. 
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Our study aims to provide additional evidence on the above using a more robust 
efficiency measure that accounts for NPLs, and also a more robust test of convergence. 
Furthermore we focus on the impact of the GFC which has largely been ignored in existing 
studies, and estimate the competition level in European banking pre- and post- crisis using the 
Rosse-Panzar method.  We elaborate on these contributions in the remaining sections of this 
paper. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Bank Efficiency with undesirable outputs: A parametric distance function 
Several studies have provided evidence that ignoring NPLs as an undesirable output in 
the production process can bias and potentially inflate the efficiency results (Fernandez et al. 
2002; Atkinson and Dorfman, 2005; Park and Weber, 2006; Assaf et al, 2013; Fujii et al. 2014). 
The famous framework proposed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) also suggests a strong 
relationship between loan quality and efficiency in both directions. A bank with low NPLs for 
example, might seem to be low performing in comparison to another bank with high NPLs just 
because the production process did not clearly differentiate between good and undesirable 
outputs.  
 We can write the production process ( , , )P x y b  with undesirable outputs as follows:   
   ( , , ) , , :  can produce  and P x y b x y b x y b                   (1) 
where x  is a vector of inputs 1( ,..., )
N
Nx x x R  , y  is a vector of good outputs
1( ,..., )
M
My y y R  , and 1( ,..., )
P
Pb b b R   is a vector of undesirable outputs.  
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Following Cuesta et al. (2009), we represent production process in (1) using the hyperbolic 
distance function11: 
 
𝐷𝐻(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑏) = inf{𝜃 > 0: (𝑥𝜃, 𝑦 𝜃⁄ , 𝑏𝜃) 𝜖 𝑃}.      (2) 
    
This enhanced hyperbolic distance function has the advantage of dealing with both desirable 
and undesirable outputs asymmetrically, thus providing a more comprehensive representation 
of the production process12.   
The model in (2) can become even more flexible if we adopt the hyperbolic translog 
distance function, which, in a panel data context, can be expressed as follows 
 
ln(𝐷𝐻 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡) = 𝑇𝐿(𝑥𝑖𝑡⁄  , 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑏𝑖𝑡
∗ ;  𝛽) + 𝜔𝑖𝑡       (𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, . . 𝑇)                (3) 
                                
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑏𝑖𝑡
∗  are the normalized good and undesirable outputs to ensure homogeneity13, and 
𝜔𝑖𝑡  is an error term. We can also add to (3) another one sided error 𝑢𝑖  representing 
inefficiency: 
 
−ln 𝑦𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿(𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑏𝑖𝑡
∗ ;  𝛽) + (𝜔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖 )       (𝑖 = 1,2, … 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1, . . 𝑇)           (4)                   
 
                                                 
11 Cuesta et al. (2009) also derive the enhanced hyperbolic function following Färe et al. (1989). 
12 The function is non-increasing in undesirable outputs, and non-increasing in inputs 
13 For more details, see Cuesta el al. (2009).  
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The efficiency estimates each bank can be calculated by substituting these values into the 
following equation: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓i = exp[ln𝐷𝐻(𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ , 𝑏𝑖𝑡 ;  𝛽)] = exp(−𝑢𝑖 ).                       (5) 
 
3.2 Phillips and Sul convergence methodology 
 
The main view we adopt in this paper is that integration is beneficial to the EU banking markets 
as in theory; it should improve efficiency and competition by affecting the cost structures of 
banks. The Phillips and Sul panel convergence methodology14 we use in this paper consists of 
a log t regression test of convergence. This approach is well suited in the context of this study 
as it is based on a time-varying assumption which allows for both common and individual 
heterogeneity over time. This convergence approach thus enables us to identify whether the 
EU banks’ are converging on the efficiency front and if so, we can analyse the speed of 
convergence over time.  The convergence method also includes a club convergence algorithm 
which detects possible clusters of convergence. We believe that using such a test in this paper 
will enrich the analysis and provide new insight about whether clusters of convergence in 
banking efficiency exist in our sample. The Phillips and Sul’s (2007) clustering algorithm is 
based on repeated log t regressions and consists of four steps. For details on each of these steps, 
refer to Rughoo and Sarantis (2012). 
 
                                                 
14 See Technical Appendix A for an outline of the Phillips and Sul approach.  
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3.3 Market competitiveness: Rosse-Panzar Model  
Several studies in the literature test for competitiveness conditions in European banking 
industry (Nathan and Neave, 1989; Perrakis, 1991; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995; DeBandt and 
Davis, 2000; Matthews et al. 2007).  The market competitive conditions are measured by 
estimating a reduced from log-linear revenue equation: 
 
ln 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑚 ln 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑚=1  ∑ 𝛽𝑛 ln 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑛=1                                            (6) 
 
Where REV is the ratio revenue to total assets of a bank i at time t, 𝑞𝑚 represents the input 
prices and 𝑋𝑛  are bank specific variables that may determine bank’s revenue and cost 
functions. We deploy the following two variables: The asset size of banks (Assets) can be seen 
as a proxy for scale economies and we also include bank liquidity (Liq) provided by Bankscope 
and defined as net loans to total assets that captures asset liquidity risk. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is a stochastic 
disturbance term. Market power is measured by the extent to which a change in factor input 
prices (dqm,i) for m = 1,..., n is reflected in a change in equilibrium revenue (dREV*it). Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) define a measure of competition H as the sum of the elasticities of the 
reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor prices: 
 


M
m
mH
1
                                                                                                  (7) 
where 
 H ≤ 0 indicates monopoly or short-run oligopoly 
 0 < H < 1 indicates a monopolistic competition. 
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 H = 1 indicates a perfect competition. 
One problem with Rosse-Panzar model, however, is that the H-statistic can be misleading if 
the market is in long-run equilibrium. This suggests that competitive capital markets will 
equalise risk-adjusted rates of return across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of returns 
should not be significantly correlated with input prices (for details see Matthews et al., 2007; 
Molyneux and Forbes, 1995 and Shaffer, 2004). 
The equilibrium test defines the dependent variable as pre-tax profit to total assets: 
ln 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼′0 +  ∑ 𝛼′𝑚 ln 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
𝑀
𝑚=1  ∑ 𝛽′𝑛 ln 𝑋𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ,
𝑁
𝑛=1           (8) 
Equilibrium (E) has to satisfy: 
𝐸 = ∑ 𝛼′𝑚 = 0
𝑀
𝑚=1 ,  E<0 indicates that the market is in long run disequilibrium and E=0 
indicates the market equilibrium. Shaffer (2004) argues that this condition is necessary only 
for perfect competition.  
4. Data  
This study uses the intermediation approach to modelling bank production. As suggested by 
Berger and Humphrey (1997), the intermediation approach is best suited for evaluating bank 
efficiency, whereas the production approach is appropriate for evaluating the efficiency of bank 
branches.  The dataset used in this study was obtained from the BankScope database. The data 
include 400 commercial banks in the ‘old’ European Union15 covering the 2005-2012 period. 
All data are deflated to 2010 prices.  
In Table 1, we list the variables in our model. Input variables include total personnel 
expenses, total interest expenses and total operating expenses. The output variables include 
total net loans, total securities, other earning assets and non-performing loans. We follow Klein 
                                                 
15 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
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(2013), who uses impaired loans as a proxy for non-performing loans. Bankscope provides a 
level of impaired loans. Impaired loans are used in accounting and indicate the volume of loans 
that are unlikely to be paid back by debtors. This differs from NPLs that are defined by the 
regulatory body as loans that are more than 90 days past due. All these variables are well 
supported in the literature (Berger and Humprey, 1997; Altunbas et al. 2001; Fu and Heffernan, 
2007; Assaf et al., 2013 among others).   
As for the variables in the Rosse-Panzar model, we follow Matthews at al. (2007) and 
use the ratio of total revenue to total assets. The price elasticities include the price of labour 
(PL) defined as personnel expenses to fixed assets, the price of funds (PF) defined as total 
interest expenses on total deposits to total deposits and the price of capital defined as operating 
expenses to fixed assets.  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Efficiency scores 
Prior to discussing the convergence results, we focus on the efficiency results. In Table 2, we 
report the estimated coefficients of the translog model. We note that all inputs have the 
expected negative signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. We also observe that 
the elasticities of the desirable outputs are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Surprisingly, the elasticity of other earning assets is higher and hence more important in the 
production process than loans. The coefficient of the undesirable output (𝑏) has the correct 
sign, i.e. negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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<Insert Table 2 here> 
In Table 3 we report the average efficiency measures. We can see that the majority of 
countries experienced lower efficiency around the GFC (i.e. 2008 and/or 2009). The estimated 
bank efficiency levels across all the analysed countries are considerably lower in 2008 and 
2009, except for Belgium, Sweden and Portugal (in 2008) and Germany and Portugal (in 2009). 
Ireland has the lowest efficiency level among the ‘old’ EU countries. Bank efficiency levels 
are only 50.73% and 49.16% in 2009 and 2010, respectively. In 2012, the highest efficiency 
level is found in Greece, confirming the fact that the crisis in Greece was not primarily triggered 
by the banking sector. The results also show that the banking sector in the UK was strongly hit 
by the GFC, even more than all other countries. This drop in bank efficiency occurred despite 
the unprecedented level of financial support from the UK government. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
A further interesting observation is the reaction of commercial banks across the ‘old’ 
EU countries to the GFC. We would expect that shortly after the peak of GFC, banks would 
restructure their operational activities to improve or recover their efficiency. Surprisingly, 
however none of the listed countries show such an increase in efficiency or even a recovery 
back to the pre-crisis level of efficiency. Banks seem to be relatively slow to respond to 
endogenous and/or exogenous shocks in terms of adjusting their efficiency levels. This finding 
is in line with Tsionas (2006) who argues that efficiency does not quickly adjust following 
shocks to the system. In this case, the GFC has also been a unique event that bank managers 
may not have been able to handle in the best possible way. This crisis was further reinforced 
by the rapidly deteriorating balances and strict regulatory policies shortly after the crisis 
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unfolded. Bank balance sheets were substantially shrunk because of the credit crunch and an 
increase in NPLs. Consequently banks had to write off a large volume of assets. Although a 
number of large banks across the EU countries significantly reduced their labour costs in 
particular as well as operational expenses, this measure was insufficient to restore banks’ 
technical efficiency.  
 
5.2 Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test16 
In the next step in our analysis, we test for convergence in banking efficiency, firstly among 
the banks from the old EU countries (EU15); secondly among the banks from the 12 Eurozone 
countries17; thirdly on a panel of asset-weighted country scores; and finally among the ten 
largest banks across the EU. The latter two sets are used to test whether size is a determining 
factor behind the integration process. Of noteworthy importance is the fact that the magnitude 
of the convergence coefficient, bˆ , provides key information on the rate of convergence. 
Basically, the higher the value of bˆ , the faster the rate of convergence. The t-statistics obtained 
for the convergence test for technical efficiency scores for the panel of commercial banks 
within the EU15 and the 12 Eurozone countries for the period 2005-2012 are tabulated in Table 
4.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
 Our results show a lack of convergence in European banking efficiency as the null 
hypothesis of group convergence is rejected for all four panels of efficiency scores. 
                                                 
16The Gauss codes for the computation of the logt test and convergence clubs are available from Sul’s website, 
http://homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz/dsul013/.  
17 The EU15 except for Denmark, Sweden and UK 
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Interestingly, we find that size, as a common factor, does not necessarily translate into 
convergence in bank efficiency during this period.  
 Our results for the panel of EU15 banks contrast with those of Weill (2009)18 and of Casu 
and Girardone (2010) who found evidence of convergence in cost efficiency, but for the pre-
2008 financial crisis periods of 1994-2005 and 1997-2003 respectively. For robustness checks, 
as per Weill (2009), we run the following equation to estimate β-convergence for our panel of 
commercial banks: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1              (9) 
 
where 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡is the efficiency score of bank i at period t, 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1is the efficiency score at period 
t-1. 𝐷𝑖 are bank dummies and include fixed effects. β-convergence is present if the coefficient 
β is negative. The results for the β-convergence test (see Table 5) show that there is no evidence 
of convergence in banking efficiency as the coefficient of 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1 is positive for all 4 panel 
sets. These results therefore reinforce our results from the Phillips and Sul methodology.  
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
 The lack of group convergence across the EU15 countries can be explained by two main 
reasons. Firstly, the cross-country heterogeneity in European banking in the form of various 
national legislations, limitations in the sharing of cross-border data, national institutional 
                                                 
18 Weill (2009) finds evidence of convergence at the 1 % significance level in all tests.  
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characteristics, and country-specific macroeconomic variables, and secondly, the onslaught of 
the GFC which necessitated large bail-outs to avoid the spread of systemic risk. 
  In order to provide a deeper analysis of the impact of the GFC on European banking, we 
estimate the competition level for the following periods, 2005-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008-2010 
(crisis) and 2011-12 (off-peak crisis). As discussed in our methodology, we measure 
competitiveness using the Rosse-Panzar model.  
 Before starting the analysis it is important to emphasize the assumption about the long-run 
equilibrium. Shaffer (2004) argues that the condition of long-run equilibrium is only requested 
for perfect competition. In other words, the results are not biased if the condition of market 
equilibrium does not hold. In Tables 6 and 7 we report the test for market equilibrium. We see 
that the condition is fulfilled for the whole period for the EU banking sector. However, if we 
test the hypothesis about the long-run equilibrium we cannot confirm it in our sub-samples. As 
for the Eurozone we do not obtain clear evidence for the whole period. The F-statistics on the 
restriction rejects the market equilibrium at the 5% level of significance but not at 1%. Similar 
results are obtained even for the periods 2005-2007 and 2010 -2011. For the period 2011-2012 
we confirm the existence of the long-run equilibrium.  
Next, we shed light on the H statistics reported in Tables 6 and 7. The estimated H-
statistics lie between zero and one and are not significantly different over the analyzed periods. 
The sign of coefficients is consistent across estimations The estimated H statistics indicate that 
commercial banks operate under monopolistic competition. The H statistics is 0.2445 and 
0.1975 for EU countries and the Eurozone respectively. The H statistics for the individual sub-
sample shows that during the peak period of GFC, i.e. 2008-2010, competition decreased. This 
might partially explain the drop in efficiency. Although, we report an increase in the H statistics 
between 2011 and 2012 these results need to be confirmed with a longer period. Our results 
can be partially compared with a few studies such as Casu and Girardone (2006). However, the 
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main difference in our study is that we do not include savings banks and cooperative banks. In 
our view, cooperative banks and savings banks operate exclusively in domestic market and 
their business activities are not affected by internationalization factors. Therefore, the reported 
levels of the H statistics in our study reflect the true competitive conditions within the market. 
This is more in line with Molyneux et al (1994). 
 
<Insert Table 6 and 7 here> 
 
5.3 Club clustering test  
Phillips and Sul (2007) argue that the absence of group convergence may be due to the presence 
of some divergent members in the panel. Therefore, the next step in the analysis is the 
application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) clustering algorithm test which would potentially 
identify countries that are converging within different clusters and identify divergent members. 
Hence, banking integration measured through efficiency should not be ruled out just on the 
basis of the log t-test but must be analysed together with the club clustering test results. The 
test is applied to the panel of asset-weighted technical efficiency scores for the 15 EU countries 
and to the group of ten top European banks19. The test statistics are reported in Table 8. 
Contrary to the log t-test results obtained for group convergence, we find the presence of club 
formation in both panels. The first club consists of Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Netherlands but 
shows relatively low level of convergence ( bˆ  =0.890). The composition of the first club is 
revealing given that the first 3 countries have been severely hit by the crisis and engulfed in 
the Euro sovereign crisis. The second club regroups all the remaining 11 countries but exhibit 
                                                 
19 The top 10 EU banks are Crédit Agricole CIB (FR), HSBC (UK), Danske Bank A/S (DK), Société Générale 
(FR), Commerzbank AG (DE), UniCredit SpA (IT), ING Bank NV (NL), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
(ES), Barclays Bank Plc (UK), and Standard Chartered Bank (UK) 
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weak convergence ( bˆ  = -2.90). As for the panel consisting of the top 10 EU banks, we find the 
presence of 2 clubs. The first club comprises HSBC (UK) and Crédit Agricole (FR) but the 
magnitude of convergence is weak ( bˆ  = -1.267), while all remaining 8 banks in the second club 
are divergent. So overall, we find that although group convergence is not present across the 
EU15 or Eurozone countries, the results for club convergence, albeit weak, suggest that the 
global financial crisis has not brought the integration process in the European banking sector 
to a complete standstill but that nonetheless, it has seriously impaired it.  
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
5.4 Relative transition parameters for individual countries 
 
The third component of the Phillips and Sul (2007) test consists of the estimation of each 
country’s relative transition coefficient, ℎ𝑖𝑡 . The transition coefficients (see Table 9) are 
estimated from each country’s asset-weighted efficiency score per year relative to the panel 
cross-section average. Typically, if all loadings converge to the same value, δit →δ, then the 
relative transition parameters converge to one, hit →1 as the cross-sectional variance goes to 
zero. The relative transition coefficients for the EU15 countries indicate a noticeable 
convergence towards one between 2005 and 2008. However, starting in 2008, the gap between 
the countries’ coefficients starts to widen and follow on this trajectory up to the end of the 
sample period, 2012. This heterogeneity is attributed to the occurrence of the GFC and its 
detrimental impact on the convergence process. Interestingly, it is also observed that the 
parameters for Finland, Sweden and Denmark exhibit a common path. Regional proximity 
could be the driving factor here. The path for Greece, a country besieged by financial turmoil 
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is also clearly separate from the rest of the group while the path for Luxembourg is actually the 
furthest away from the group. The country’s strong economic performance and resilient 
banking sector during the crisis seems to have demarcated it from the rest of the EU15.  
 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides several important contributions to the ongoing empirical research on 
banking integration. Firstly, we use an advanced and comprehensive approach to measure bank 
efficiency. Secondly, we apply robust panel methodology to assess the convergence process in 
European banking. An integral part of the study is to investigate changes in bank efficiency 
before and during the GFC.  
 Our results show that the majority of countries experienced a fall in efficiency around the 
crisis period. The log t- test indicates that group convergence in bank efficiency is not present 
neither within the group of EU15 or within the Eurozone as a whole. The panel consisting of 
the top ten banks also show lack of convergence, although, club formation within the panels is 
present. However, all the clusters display weak convergence. 
 We attribute the lack of group convergence to the impact of the financial crisis on the 
European banking sector. The twin effects of the global crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis have challenged the European banking sector in numerous ways. Instability has 
transpired through deteriorating loan portfolio quality and necessitating the bail-outs of large 
institutions across the EU15. European banks now face the challenges of re-regulation 
including higher capital requirements and lower leveraging, amongst others. These banks will 
have no choice but to attempt to regain the losses by improving their efficiency. In addition, 
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given the drive by the European Commission to reform the European banking sector into an 
efficient and stable system, European banks will have to utilise their assets more efficiently 
and with increased competition,  the integration of European banking may well re-emerge. 
 The presented results also have important policy implications. The study 
unambiguously confirms that the GFC has undermined bank performance. The question that 
remains is whether the impact of the GFC is temporary or whether it will cause deeper problems 
for the integration process. The crisis has caused the collapse or an almost collapse of a large 
number of well-established EU banks. The main weakness of the integration process has been 
a weak and not fully implemented integrated framework for bank supervision and regulation. 
We have witnessed a typical systemic crisis across the individual EU countries. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it is now evident that the financial crisis has thrown the financial 
integration process into reverse. The extensive rescue packages to the individual banks across 
the EU countries provided by EU authorities and domestic governments have not yet been fully 
materialized. We assume that the process of stabilising and consolidating the banking system 
will be longer than expected. Our results further reveal that the process of bank integration has 
been severely destabilised. When it comes to regulation, national regulators should play a 
pivotal role in the restructuring and tuning up the domestic banking sector. This argument is 
mainly supported by the fact the national financial regulator have detailed knowledge not only 
about the individual banks but also about the economic environment that has to be taken into 
account during this recovery period. In other words, a more individualistic approach should be 
adopted during this transition and recovery period.  
 
 The study can be further extended by conducting an analysis of productivity convergence 
over time and during the crisis years. Fuji et al. (2014) propose a new methodological 
framework that quantifies the contribution of individual components (outputs/inputs) to bank 
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efficiency and TFP change. Application of such a methodological framework might help better 
understand the bottlenecks of the convergence process. Last but not least, it would also be 
important to expand the analysed sample to include the new EU countries.  
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Technical Appendix A 
An outline of the Phillips and Sul approach 
A.1 Relative transition parameters 
Using panel data on itX  we can decompose in two components comprising systematic 
components, itg , and transitory components, ita , as follows: 
ititit agX            (1) 
To estimate the time-varying loadings, itg  using the Phillips and Sul (2007) we rewrite (1) such 
that the common and idiosyncratic components are separated as follows: 
titt
t
itit
it
ag
X 






 
 for all i and t,        (2) 
where t is a single common component and it is a time varying idiosyncratic element. Hence, 
it  measures the economic distance between the common trend component t and itX . To 
test whether the components of it are converging, Phillips and Sul (2007) define the transition 
coefficient as ith and information about the time varying factor loadings it  can be extracted as 
follows: 
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The so-called relative transition parameter ith  measures it  in relation to the panel average at 
time t and therefore describes the transition path for country i relative to the panel average.  
 
A.2. The log t regression 
 
The log t regression test of convergence tests the following hypothesis: 
  iH :0 and 0  
  iH :1 for all i or 0  
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
To conduct the Phillips and Sul’s (2007)20 procedure we use the following three steps:  
Step 1: Calculate the cross sectional variance ratio 
tH
H1
 is calculated as follows: 



N
i
itt h
N
H
1
2)1(
1
          (4) 
 
Step 2: Perform an OLS regression as follows: 
 
t
t
utbatL
H
H
Log ˆlogˆˆ)(log21 





                (5) 
                                                 
20 The log t regression is also described in detail in Rughoo and Sarantis (2012). 
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where L(t) = log(t+1) and the fitted coefficient of log t is ˆ2ˆ b , where ˆ  is the estimate of 
 in H0. The data for this regression starts at t =[rT] with some r > 0. Based on the results of 
their Monte-Carlo simulations, Phillips and Sul (2007) recommend r = 0.3.  
Step 3: Estimate a one-sided t test of null 0  using bˆ and a standard error estimated using a 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator. As the test statistic 
b
t ˆ  is 
normally distributed we reject the null hypothesis of convergence at 
b
t ˆ <-1.65.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mil EUR) 
Variables Interest 
expenses 
𝑥1  
Operating 
expenses 
𝑥2  
Personnel 
expenses 
𝑥3  
Loans 
 
𝑦1  
Securities 
 
𝑦2  
 
Other 
earning 
assets 
𝑦3  
Nonperforming 
loans 
𝑏 
        
Mean 1037302 286913.2 315640.6 2.12e+07 1.85e+07 2.61e+07 2151469 
Max 1.06e+08 1.65e+07 1.71e+07 8.17e+08 1.74e+09 9.47e+08 8.54e+07 
Min 0.1961761 5.139053 8.655822 0.218113 0.1090565 4.334257 4.391906 
Std 4538902 1205949 1338040 8.00e+07 1.03e+08 9.44e+07 7218409 
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TABLE 2 
Technical Efficiency -Estimation 
VARIABLES -ly2 
  
lnx1 -0.179*** 
 (0.00702) 
lnx2 -0.0687*** 
 (0.0126) 
lnx3 -0.254*** 
 (0.0137) 
lny1 0.150*** 
 (0.0157) 
lny3 0.265*** 
 (0.0162) 
Lnb -0.0193*** 
 (0.00514) 
lnx11 -0.0495*** 
 (0.00445) 
lnx22 -0.0362*** 
 (0.0109) 
lnx33 -0.0913*** 
 (0.0129) 
lny11 -0.0201 
 (0.014) 
lny33 0.0193 
 (0.0163) 
lnbb -0.0016 
 (0.00219) 
lnx1lnx2 -0.00548 
 (0.0051) 
lnx1lnx3 0.0505*** 
 (0.00608) 
lnx2lnx3 0.0443*** 
 (0.00997) 
lnx1lny1 -0.0001 
 (0.00579) 
lnx1lny3 -0.00476 
 (0.00604) 
lnx2lny1 0.0401*** 
 (0.0114) 
lnx2lny3 -0.0343*** 
 (0.0123) 
lnx3lny1 -0.0581*** 
 (0.0129) 
lnx3lny3 0.0618*** 
 (0.0139) 
lnx1lnb 0.00686*** 
 (0.00211) 
lnx2lnb -0.00302 
 (0.00442) 
lnx3lnb -0.0031 
 (0.00446) 
lny1lny3 0.0178 
 (0.0145) 
lny1lnb 0.0277*** 
 (0.00448) 
lny3lnb -0.0257*** 
 (0.00466) 
year_2012 0.112*** 
 (0.0243) 
year_2011 0.0868*** 
 (0.0205) 
year_2010 0.0266 
 (0.0174) 
year_2009 0.0564*** 
 (0.0148) 
year_2008 0.150*** 
 (0.0141) 
year_2007 0.116*** 
 (0.012) 
year_2006 0.0515*** 
 (0.0104) 
Intercept 0.288*** 
 (0.0365) 
  
Observations 2,072 
Number of id 400 
 
* Significant at the 10%. 
** Significant at the 5%. 
*** Significant at the 1%. 
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Table 3: Technical efficiency levels 
 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Austria 0.6084 0.6017 0.6155 0.6290 0.6608 0.6731 0.6774 0.6893 
Belgium 0.6551 0.6673 0.7151 0.7257 0.7360 0.6874 0.6991 0.7105 
Denmark 0.6034 0.6169 0.6092 0.6218 0.6314 0.6617 0.6687 0.6811 
Finland 0.5485 0.5629 0.5770 0.5665 0.5805 0.6408 0.6530 0.6418 
France 0.6455 0.6544 0.6752 0.6884 0.7103 0.7120 0.7132 0.7290 
Germany 0.6719 0.6328 0.7006 0.7313 0.7263 0.7435 0.7381 0.6988 
Greece 0.6895 0.7012 0.7118 0.7230 0.7350 0.7706 0.7728 0.7897 
Ireland 0.5351 0.5221 0.4916 0.5073 0.5502 0.5739 0.5826 0.6127 
Italy 0.6229 0.6420 0.6502 0.6673 0.6721 0.6795 0.6939 0.7185 
Luxembourg 0.6138 0.6092 0.5763 0.6226 0.6846 0.7483 0.8123 0.8734 
Netherlands 0.5773 0.5898 0.6036 0.6157 0.6402 0.6884 0.6636 0.6524 
Portugal 0.6876 0.7141 0.7352 0.7429 0.7345 0.7053 0.7239 0.7411 
Spain 0.5651 0.5762 0.5568 0.5706 0.6160 0.6609 0.6282 0.6208 
Sweeden 0.5664 0.5866 0.6006 0.5973 0.6271 0.5769 0.5922 0.6016 
United Kingdom 0.5738 0.5937 0.6089 0.6275 0.6528 0.6583 0.6753 0.6722 
European Union 0.6151 0.6256 0.6364 0.6518 0.6717 0.6807 0.6869 0.6957 
Eurozone 0.6282 0.6359 0.6472 0.6627 0.6811 0.6917 0.6937 0.7075 
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Table 4: Phillips and Sul Logt test 
Data sets bˆ  
t-statistics 
Technical efficiency 
 
EU15 countries 
 
Eurozone countries 
 
Asset-weighted country efficiency scores 
 
Top 10 EU15 banks 
 
 
-1.767 
 
-1.762 
 
-1.751 
 
-1.770 
 
 
-70.274* 
 
-69.356* 
 
-67.433* 
 
-70.978* 
 
Note: a) The Phillips and Sul (2007) log t-test were run in OxEdit using the Gauss code programmed by Sul 
(2007); b)* Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level; c) The results 
are generated using Ox version 4.00 (see Doornik, 2006); d) There are 113 banks in total across the EU15 
countries and 84 for the Eurozone countries. 
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Table 5: β-convergence 
Panel data sets Coefficient 
EU15 banks’ efficiency scores 
 
Eurozone banks’ efficiency scores 
 
Asset weighted country efficiency scores 
 
Top 10 EU15 banks 
0.048 
 
0.048 
 
0.047 
 
0.048 
 
Note: The coefficient for the β-convergence test is positive implying that there is no convergence.  
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Table 6 
Tests of competitive conditions in EU 15 countries (Dependent variable lnREV/TA) 
EU 2005-2012 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 
Intercept 1.3158*** 0.9780 2.5761*** 2.7670 
Ln PL -0.1745*** -0.3778*** -0.3246*** -0.0109 
Ln PF 0.3881*** 0.4434** 0.3829*** 0.2536*** 
Ln PC 0.0309*** 0.0514** 0.0381*** 0.0146 
Ln Liq -0.0357** -0.0014** -0.0491*** -0.0289 
Ln Assets -0.2223*** -0.2506*** -0.3495*** -0.3117*** 
H0: H=0 F(1,1640)=136.98*** F(1,401)=5.04** F(1,485)=6.05** F(1,222)=12.33*** 
H1: H=1 F(1,1640)=1306.87*** F(1,401)=286.63*** F(1,485)=531.23*** F(1,222)=102.76** 
H 0.2445 0.1171 0.0964 0.2573 
H0: E=0 F(1,2240)=0.60 F(1,570)=7.10** F(1,622)=4.91*** F(1,290)=4.05*** 
𝑅2 within 0.6488 0.6284 0.7276 0.3715 
* Significant at the 10%. 
** Significant at the 5%. 
*** Significant at the 1%. 
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Table 7 
Tests of competitive conditions in the Eurozone (Dependent variable lnREV/TA) 
Eurozone 2005-2012 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 
Intercept 1.4253*** 0.9609* 3.5663*** 2.1096** 
Ln PL -0.2473*** -0.3785*** -0.3195*** -0.0459 
Ln PF 0.4139*** 0.4849*** 0.4129*** 0.3834 
Ln PC 0.0309** 0.0497** 0.0338*** 0.0153 
Ln Liq -0.0431*** -0.0007 -0.0652*** -0.0409* 
Ln Assets -0.2437 -0.2417* -0.4023 -0.2396 
H0: H=0 F(1,1248)=49.85*** F(1,334)=7.38*** F(1,353)=6.65** F(1,152)=20.03*** 
H1: H=1 F(1,1248)=823.48** F(1,334)=215.51*** F(1,353)=312.5** F(1,152)=675.32*** 
H 0.1975 0.1561 0.1272 0.3528 
H0: E=0 F(1,1681)=4.96** F(1,436)=6.25** F(1,467)=6.22** F(1,206)=1.39 
𝑅2 within 0.6784 0.6438 0.7019 0.5415 
* Significant at the 10%. 
** Significant at the 5%. 
*** Significant at the 1%. 
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Table 8. Phillips and Sul (2007) club convergence test  
Country asset-weighted scores  
Club 1: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands 
Club 2: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,     Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK 
 
10 Top EU banks 
Club 1: Crédit Agricole CIB(FR), HSBC (UK) 
Divergent: Danske Bank A/S (DK), Société Générale (FR), Commerzbank AG (DE), 
UniCredit SpA (IT), ING Bank NV (NL), Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (ES), 
Barclays Bank Plc (UK), Standard Chartered Bank (UK) 
 
0.890 
-2.900 
 
 
 
-1.267 
-1.760 
 
0.154 
-0.596 
 
 
 
-1.494 
-61.510* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Data series 
 
bˆ  
t-statistics 
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Table 9: Relative transition parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Yr AT BE DK FIT FR DE GR IE IT LUX NL PT ES SE UK 
2005 1.11 0.95 0.87 0.77 1.06 0.99 1.13 0.92 1.04 1.23 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.87 0.97 
2006 1.11 0.94 0.86 0.76 1.07 0.99 1.13 0.92 1.04 1.24 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.86 0.97 
2007 1.12 0.94 0.86 0.75 1.07 0.99 1.14 0.92 1.04 1.25 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.85 0.96 
2008 1.13 0.94 0.85 0.74 1.07 0.99 1.15 0.91 1.04 1.26 1.02 1.06 1.03 0.85 0.96 
2009 1.13 0.93 0.84 0.73 1.08 0.99 1.15 0.91 1.04 1.28 1.02 1.07 1.03 0.84 0.96 
2010 1.14 0.93 0.83 0.72 1.08 0.99 1.16 0.90 1.04 1.29 1.02 1.07 1.03 0.83 0.96 
2011 1.14 0.93 0.83 0.70 1.08 0.98 1.17 0.90 1.05 1.31 1.03 1.07 1.03 0.82 0.96 
2012 1.15 0.92 0.82 0.69 1.09 0.98 1.18 0.89 1.05 1.32 1.03 1.07 1.03 0.82 0.95 
